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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-3(3) (Supp. 1992). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Should Judge Rigtrup's decision, that plaintiff/ 
respondent Kennecott Corporation ("Kennecott") is entitled to 
relief respecting its January 1, 1983 assessment by the Utah 
State Tax Commission under this court's decision in Rio Algom 
Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984) holding Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-5-109 (Supp. 1981) unconstitutional, be sustained? 
2. Would denial of relief to Kennecott constitute a 
violation of Kennecottfs due process and equal protection rights 
under the Utah and United States Constitutions? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented in this appeal are questions of 
law. The trial court's decisions on these issues are reviewed 
for correctness. Sharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 
1985) . 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS1 
1. Utah Constitution, Article XIII, Section 2: 
(1) All tangible property in the state, 
not exempt under the laws of the United 
States, or under this Constitution, shall be 
taxed at a uniform and equal rate in 
1
 A verbatim presentation of the constitutional provisions and 
statutes are included in the Addendum at page B-l. 
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proportion to its value, to be ascertained as 
provided by law. 
2. Utah Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3: 
The Legislature shall provide by law a 
uniform and equal rate of assessment on all 
tangible property in the state, according to 
its value in money, . . . . The Legislature 
shall prescribe by law such provisions as 
shall secure a just valuation for taxation of 
such property, so that every person and cor-
poration shall pay a tax in proportion to the 
value of his, her, or its tangible property, 
3. Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution, 
Section I: 
. . . No State shall . . . deprive any 
person of life, liberty or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction equal protection of 
the laws. 
4. Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of 
law. 
5. Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 24: 
All laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation. 
6. Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109 (Supp. 1981): 
All locally assessed taxable real property 
shall be appraised at current fair market 
value and the value of such property rolled 
back to its January 1, 1978, level as such 
level is determined by the state tax 
commission. 
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7. Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-12 (Supp. 1986): 
If the owner of any property assessed by the 
state tax commission . . . objects to the 
assessment, [it] may, before the tenth day of 
April, apply to the commission for a 
hearing. . . . 
8. Utah Code Ann. § 59-11-11 (Supp. 1983): 
In all cases of levy of taxes, . . . which is 
deemed unlawful by the party whose property 
is thus taxed, . . . such party may pay under 
protest such tax . . . to the officers desig-
nated and authorized by law to collect the 
same; and thereupon the party so paying 
. . . may bring an action in the tax division 
of the appropriate district court . . . to 
recover said tax . . . paid under protest. 
9. Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-1 (Supp. 1981): 
All taxable property, not specifically exempt 
under Article XIII, section 2, of the Consti-
tution of Utah, must be assessed at 20% of 
its reasonable fair cash value . . . . 
10. Utah Code Ann. § 59-24-2 (Supp. 1986): 
(1) Within 30 days after notice of any deci-
sion by the state tax commission rendered 
after a formal hearing before it, any 
aggrieved party appearing before the commis-
sion or county whose tax revenues are 
affected by the decision may appeal or peti-
tion for review to the tax division of the 
district court located in the county of resi-
dence or principal place of business of the 
affected taxpayer . . . 
11. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-25 (1989): 
If the subdivision is unable to pay the claim 
or award during the current fiscal year it 
may pay the claim or award in not more than 
ten ensuing annual installments of equal size 
or in such other installments as are agree-
able to the claimant. 
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12. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-27 (1989): 
(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to 
the contrary, all political subdivisions may 
levy an annual property tax sufficient to pay 
the following: 
(a) any claim; 
(b) any settlement; 
(c) any judgment, . . . ; 
(d) the cost to defend any claim, set-
tlement, or judgment; or 
(e) the establishment and maintenance 
of a reserve fund for the payment of claims, 
settlements or judgments as may be reasonably 
anticipated. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case is an appeal by Salt Lake County (the 
"County") from a summary judgment entered in favor of Kennecott 
by the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup of the Third Judicial District 
Court on February 28, 1992 which reduced the assessed value of 
Kennecottfs property assessed by the Utah State Tax Commission 
(the "Commission") as of January 1, 1983, from $136,449,995 to 
2 
$123,405,445. See Record at 696. Kennecott originally brought 
this proceeding before the Commission, pursuant to the provisions 
of Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-12 (Supp. 1986), and then appealed the 
2
 Copies of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Sum-
mary Judgment dated February 28, 1992 are included in the Adden-
dum at page A-l. 
-4-
Commission's decision to the Tax Division of the Third Judicial 
District Court under the Tax Court Act. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-24-2 (Supp. 1986); Record at 1-5. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below. 
1. Kennecott initiated this case on June 1, 1983, 
when it, pursuant to provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-12, 
supra, filed a petition with the Commission protesting the Janu-
ary 1, 1983 assessed value of Kennecottfs centrally assessed 
property. Kennecott received its Notice of Assessment from the 
Commission on or about May 24, 1983. Kennecott's petition 
asserted that Kennecott should have its centrally assessed prop-
erty treated in the same fashion as locally assessed property 
under the "rollback" statute, Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109, supra. 
The Commission, after an informal hearing in which the County 
appeared and participated, denied the assessed value reduction 
sought by Kennecott. See Record at 1-5, 20-23. 
2. In a related proceeding Kennecott filed a tax pro-
test action under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 59-11-11 
(Supp. 1983) with the Third Judicial District Court, Civil 
No. C84-3049, wherein Kennecott requested from the District Court 
the same relief it was seeking from the Commission in Kennecott!s 
appeal of its centrally assessed property. See Record at 21 and 
Utah Supreme Court Case No. 92-0286, Kennecott Corporation v. 
Salt Lake County. 
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3. After the Commission's informal hearing decision, 
Kennecott requested a formal hearing. Before the formal hearing 
was held, this court issued its decision in Rio Alaom Mining 
Corp. v. San Juan County, supra, holding Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-5-109, supra, unconstitutional in violation of Article XIII, 
Sections 2 and 3 of the Utah Constitution. Following a formal 
hearing, the Commission again denied Kennecott the relief it 
requested, i.e.. a reduction in the assessed value of Kennecottfs 
centrally assessed real property. See Record at 20-23. 
4. Pursuant to the provisions of the Tax Court Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-24-1 et seq. (Supp. 1986), Kennecott then 
brought an action in the Tax Division of the Third Judicial Dis-
trict Court appealing the Commission's refusal to reduce the 
value of Kennecott!s centrally assessed real property. See 
Record at 1-5. 
5. The Tax Division of the Third Judicial District 
Court determined that Kennecott, as an owner of centrally 
assessed real property which had an appeal of the assessed value 
of its centrally assessed property pending before the Commission 
at the time Rio Algom waLS decided by this court, was entitled to 
relief from the unconstitutional assessment of its property if. it 
could meet the criteria for relief set out by the court in Rio 
Alaom. The Tax Division Court then remanded the case to the Com-
mission for further proceedings. See Record at 219-21. 
-6-
6. After another formal hearing, conducted by the 
Commission following remand, the District Court entered summary 
judgment sustaining the Commission's reduction in value of Kenne-
cottfs centrally assessed real property as a result of Kenne-
cottfs having met the Rio Algom criteria. See Record at 697-701. 
It is from this summary judgment that the County is herein 
appealing. 
C. Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented. 
1. On June 1, 1983, Kennecott filed a Protest of 
Notice of Assessment and Petition for Hearing with the Commission 
challenging the assessed value of Kennecott's centrally assessed 
property as of January 1, 1983. Kennecott received the Notice of 
Assessment that was challenged in this protest on, or after, May 
24, 1983. See Record at 42-44. 
2. In its protest, Kennecott asserted that its cen-
trally assessed property was excessively valued in violation of 
relevant provisions of the Utah Constitution because locally 
assessed real property had its value rolled back to its 1978 
level through the application of Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109, 
supra, whereas the value of Kennecott!s centrally assessed real 
property had not been rolled back. See Record at 20-23. 
3. After an informal hearing held on June 29, 1983, 
the Commission, in a decision dated January 26, 1984, denied 
Kennecott any reduction in the assessed value of Kennecott!s 
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property. On February 29, 1984, Kennecott petitioned the Commis-
sion for a formal hearing respecting the value of its centrally 
assessed property. Id. 
4. On May 23, 1984, Kennecott filed a tax protest 
action under Utah Code Ann. § 59-11-11 (Supp. 1983) with the 
Third Judicial District Court respecting those property taxes it 
paid Salt Lake County under protest on November 30, 1983. The 
relief sought in this tax protest action, and the grounds for 
that relief, were virtually the same as in Kennecott's assessment 
proceeding pending before the Commission. That tax protest 
action, following a judgment entered in favor of Kennecott by 
Judge Brian of the Third Judicial District Court, has also been 
appealed by the County. See Utah Supreme Court Case No. 92-0286, 
Kennecott Corporation v. Salt Lake County. 
5. Prior to the Commission's initial formal hearing 
in this case on June 4, 1984, this court issued its decision on 
March 13, 1984 in Rio Algom Mining Corp. v. San Juan County. 681 
P.2d 184 (Utah 1984), which held Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109, 
supra, unconstitutional as a violation of the plaintiff*s rights 
under Article XIII, Sections 2 and 3 of the Utah Constitution 
respecting taxes paid in 1981. Kennecottfs request for a formal 
hearing with the Commission was filed on February 29, 1984, prior 
to this Courtf s decision in Rio Algom. supra. not after the 
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issuance of that decision as asserted by the County in the Coun-
ty's brief. See Record 20-97. 
6. On June 27, 1985, the Commission issued its deci-
sion following the Commission's initial formal hearing which was 
conducted on September 11, 1984. In that decision the Commission 
again refused to grant Kennecott any reduction in the assessed 
value of Kennecott's property as of January 1, 1983, specifically 
refusing to apply this court's holding that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-5-109 was unconstitutional. Even though the Commission's 
formal hearing decision is dated June 27, 1985, it was not issued 
by the Commission, or mailed to Kennecott, until October 31, 
1985. See Record 2-22. 
7. On November 27, 1985, Kennecott filed a "Com-
plaint, Notice of Appeal, and Petition for Review of a Decision 
of the Utah State Tax Commission" with the Tax Division of the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Civil 
No. C85-8015, pursuant to the Utah Tax Court Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-24-2, supra, whereby it appealed the Commission's formal 
hearing decision. Kennecott asserted, in this lawsuit, that the 
Commission's decision refusing to grant Kennecott the rollback 
under Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109 as of January 1, 1983, when that 
rollback had been extended to locally assessed real property, 
violated Kennecott's rights under Article XIII, Sections 2, 3 and 
4 of the Utah Constitution. See Record at 1-5. 
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8. The Commission, and the County, in response to 
Kennecott's complaint, brought a Motion to Dismiss upon the 
grounds that Rio Algom foreclosed any relief because Kennecott 
was not one of the named plciintiffs in Rio Algom. See Record 
at 12. The District Court denied this Motion to Dismiss, but 
remanded the case to the Commission for a new formal hearing to 
determine if Kennecott could meet the criteria for relief speci-
fied in Rio Algom, and, if so, what reduction should be granted. 
See Record at 219-21. The District Court specifically held as 
follows: 
Kennecott's protest of its 1983 ad valo-
rem assessment was timely filed pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann., section 59-7-12 (1953), and 
was pending before the Utah State Tax Commis-
sion at the time the Utah Supreme Court 
decided Rio Algom, et al. v. San Juan County, 
et al., 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984). That case 
does not deny a taxpayer having a pending 
assessment challenge on March 13, 1984, the 
date Rio Algom was decided, the opportunity 
of fully pursuing its protest and obtaining 
any relief to which it may be entitled pursu-
ant to Utah Code Annotated, section 59-7-12 
(1953), as amended. The decision following 
formal hearing of the Utah State Tax Commis-
sion on Kennecott's valuation protest was 
based upon the Tax Commission's interpreta-
tion of the decision in Rio Algom, an inter-
pretation that Kennecott was entitled to no 
relief under either Rio Algom. et al. v. San 
Juan County, et al., supra, or Article XIII, 
Section 2 and 3, Utah Constitution. The Com-
mission made no findings and reached no con-
clusions about value, and as to whether the 
requirements of Article XIII, Sections 2 and 
3, Utah Constitution had been met. This 
decision by the Tax Commission was erroneous. 
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Record at 220. 
9. On June 24, 1987, following a formal hearing upon 
remand, the Commission entered an Amended Final Decision and 
Order which reduced the January 1, 1983 assessed value of Kenne-
cott^ property from the original assessed value of $136,449,995 
to $114,642,841. See Record at 247-50. That Amended Final Deci-
sion and Order was appealed to the District Court by the County. 
The District Court again remanded the proceeding to the Commis-
sion for reexamination of Kennecottfs January 1, 1983 assessed 
value in light of Rio Algom. See Record at 423-29. 
10. On September 5, 1991, the Commission entered an 
order, based upon another formal hearing held on August 15, 1990 
after the second remand, which expressly held that Kennecott had 
met the Rio Algom criteria for relief under that decision. The 
Commission then ordered a reduction in the assessed value of Ken-
necott fs centrally assessed property from $136,449,995 to 
$123,405,445. See Record at 457-61. 
11. On February 28, 1992, the District Court entered 
its "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Summary Judgment" 
which: 
(a) concluded that "comparable locally assessed 
real property in Salt Lake County was undervalued by a factor of 
1.4 in relation to Kennecott!s centrally assessed property as of 
January 1, 1983"; 
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(b) "thcit in order to equalize the value of Ken-
necott !s centrally assessed property with the assessed value of 
comparable locally assessed property, Kennecott's real property 
should have its assessed value rolled back by a factor of 1.4" as 
of January 1, 1983; and 
(c) affirmed, in its entirety, through a de novo 
independent review of the record before the Commission, the order 
and decision of the Commission reducing the assessed value of 
Kennecott's centrally assessed property from $136,449,995 to 
$123,405,445. See Record at 696-701. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly concluded that Rio Algom did 
not foreclose Kennecott's challenge to its January 1, 1983 
assessment upon the basis that Kennecott1s rights under Article 
XIII, Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Utah Constitution were violated 
when locally assessed real property was rolled back to its Janu-
ary 1, 1978 level, whereas Kennecott's centrally aissessed real 
property was not given the benefit of that rollback. Under Utah 
law Kennecott had done everything in its power to protect its 
assertion that Kennecott!s constitutional rights were violated by 
the Commission in the original January 1, 1983 assessment. 
Kennecott's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 7 and 24 
of the Utah Constitution will be violated if Kennecott is not 
-12-
permitted to challenge its assessment as unlawful because of an 
unconstitutional statute. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
JUDGE RIGTRUP WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING 
KENNECOTT WAS ENTITLED TO RELIEF FROM THE 
APPLICATION OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE AS 
TO KENNECOTT1S JANUARY 1, 1983 ASSESSMENT. 
In Rio Algom Mining Corp. v. San Juan County. 681 P.2d 
184 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court held that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-5-109 (Supp. 1981) was unconstitutional and invalid because 
the statute violated the provisions of Article XIII, Sections 2 
and 3 of the Utah Constitution. The statute which the court held 
unconstitutional was effective in 1981, 1982, 1983 and, prior to 
its repeal, in 1984. In declaring that the Rio Algom plaintiffs1 
rights under Article XIII, Sections 2 and 3 of the Utah Constitu-
tion were violated in 19 81, as a result of the implementation by 
San Juan County of Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109, supra, the court 
stated: 
It necessarily follows that an indefinite, 
partial freeze on the valuation of some prop-
erties in the state is inherently inconsis-
tent with the basic concept of an ad valorem 
tax system. Inevitably, the statute would 
produce valuations that are not based on mar-
ket value and that are in violation of the 
principal of uniformity. 
681 P.2d at 195. And further: 
In sum, the fixing of baseline assessments of 
county-assessed real properties as of a given 
year in the past, see Utah Hotel Company v. 
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Yoraason. Utah, 659 P.2d 1056 (1983), is a 
violation of Article XIII, Sections 2 and 3 
and is unconstitutional, 
681 P.2d at 195. 
Following this declaration of unconstitutionality, the 
court then discussed the effect its decision was to be given, 
stating as follows: 
One of the criticisms of giving only prospec-
tive effect to a decision is that it turns 
the court's opinion into an advisory opinion 
or dicta. It also deprives the litigants, 
who have sustained the burden of attacking an 
unconstitutional statute, of the fruits of 
their victory,. For this reason, prospective 
effect may erven discourage challenges to 
statutes of questionable validity. In 
response to these considerations, some deci-
sions that give only prospective effect to a 
holding of unconstitutionality as to all 
other parties give the holding retroactive 
effect as to the litigants or others who have 
litigation pending. [Citations deleted.] We 
gave this kind of limited retroactive effect 
to a decision that local government legisla-
tion was unconstitutional, a decision that 
was otherwise prospective only., [Citations 
deleted.] 
For the same reasons that motivated the 
foregoing decisions, we direct that our hold-
ing of unconstitutionality be prospective and 
effective only from and after January 1, 
1984. As to the six plaintiff-taxpayers who 
are parties to this appeal, however, this 
decision shall be retroactive for the year 
for which this suit for refund was brought. 
681 P.2d at 196. 
The County, in this appeal, is aisserting that the mean-
ing of the court's decision respecting the retroactive, versus 
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prospective, effect of Rio Algom is that Kennecott, a state 
assessed property owner which took every step available under 
Utah law to properly assert that its rights under the Utah con-
stitution had been violated in the January 1, 1983 Commission 
assessment, has no relief available to it even though Kennecott1s 
constitutional rights were admittedly violated in that 
3 
assessment. 
This argument by the County is not supported by Rio 
Algom. As shown in the language from Rio Algom reproduced above, 
the court in that decision did not address the situation of par-
ties who, at the time of the decision, had litigation pending 
challenging the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109, 
Kennecott's precise position in this case. What was specifically 
addressed in Rio Algom was (1) the rights of the six plaintiffs 
in that case; and (2) the general retroactive effect of the hold-
ing that Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109 was unconstitutional. A care-
ful review of the Rio Algom decision reveals that with respect to 
3
 As is shown in Kennecott's Statement of Relevant Facts, 
supra. Kennecott initiated its challenge to its 1983 assessment 
as required under Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-12 before the Rio Algom 
decision was issued. Not only did Kennecott challenge its 
assessment before the Commission under Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-12, 
it also commenced the tax protest action under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-11-11, supra, within six months of paying these taxes under 
protest, when it became clear that no final decision respecting 
Kennecott!s assessment would be forthcoming from the Commission 
before the six month statute of limitations respecting tax pro-
test actions would have run. Thus, Kennecott did all it could to 
preserve its rights. 
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the issue of prospectivity versus retroactivity, the court was 
relying upon the law of pure prospectivity in setting an effec-
tive date of January 1, 1984, even though what was implemented by 
the court in Rio Alaom was "modified" or "selective" 
* . • • -
 4 prospectivity. 
In a very recent decision of the United States Supreme 
Court "selective" prospectivity, as urged by the County in this 
case, was specifically rejected. In James B. Beam Distilling Co. 
v. Georgia, 501 U.S. , 111 S. Ct. 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 481 
(1991), the Court held that "selective" prospectivity was inap-
propriate in a civil context because it violates the principles 
of stare decisis and the rule of law. In Beam the Court stated: 
But selective prospectivity also breaches the 
principle that litigants in similar situa-
tions should be treated the same, a 
4
 "Selective" or "modified" prospectivity is a situation where 
the new rule of law is applied to the litigants before the court, 
and perhaps to others with litigation pending, retroactively, but 
prospectively as to all others. "Pure" prospectivity, is the 
situation where the new rule of law is only applied after the 
effective date of the newly announced rule of law. It is not 
applied retroactively to anyone, including the litigants in the 
case where the new rule is announced. Each of the following 
cases cited in the Rio Algom decision is a "pure" prospectivity, 
not a "selective" prospectivity, decision: Loyal Order of Moose 
v. County Board, 657 P.2d 257 (Utah 1982); Great Northern Railway 
v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932); Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973); Northern Construction Pipeline Co. 
v. Marathon Pipeline Co.. 458 U.S. 50 (1982); Southern Pacific 
Co. v. Cochise County. 377 P.2d 770 (Ariz. 1963); Deltona Corp. 
v. Bailey, 336 So.2d 1163 (Fla. 1976); Jacobs v. Lexington -
Fayette Urban County Gov't. 450 SW.2d 10 (Ky. 1977); Salorio v. 
Glaser, 461 A.2d 1100 (N.J. 1983); Soo Line Railroad v. State, 
286 NW.2d 459 (N.D. 1979); Gottlieb v. Citv of Milwaukee. 147 
NW.2d 633 (Wis. 1977). 
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fundamental component of stare decisis and 
the rule of law generally. See R. 
Wasserstrom, The Judicial Decision 69-72 
(1961). "We depart from this basic judicial 
tradition when we simply pick and choose from 
among similarly situated defendants those who 
alone will receive the benefit of a 'new1 
rule of constitutional law." Desist v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258-59, 22 
L.Ed.2d 248, 89 S. Ct. 1030 (1969) (Harlan, 
J. , dissenting); see also. Von Moschzisker, 
Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 
Harv. L. Rev. 409, 425 (1924). For this rea-
son, we abandoned the possibility of selec-
tive prospectivity in the criminal context in 
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 93 
L.Ed.2d 649, 107 S. Ct. 708 (1987), even 
where the new rule constituted a "clear 
break" with previous law, in favor of com-
pletely retroactive application of all deci-
sions to cases pending on direct review. 
Though Griffith was held not to dispose of 
the matter of civil retroactivity, see id. , 
at 322, n.8, 93 L.Ed.2d 649, 107 S. Ct. 708, 
selective prospectivity appears never to have 
been endorsed in the civil context. [Ameri-
can Trucking Associations, Inc. v.] Smith, 
496 U.S. [167] at , 110 L.Ed.2d 148, 110 
S. Ct. 2323 (plurality opinion). This case 
presents the issue.5 
Ill S. Ct. 2445, 115 L.Ed.2d 489-90. 
In Beam, the plaintiff brought an action against Geor-
gia seeking a refund of taxes paid under a statute which had been 
held unconstitutional in violation of the commerce clause in 
5
 The Court's opinion in Beam was a plurality decision, writ-
ten by Justice Souter and joined in by Justice Stevens. Justice 
White wrote a concurring opinion which also rejected "selective" 
prospectivity, but reserved the issue of "pure" prospectivity. 
Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion which was joined in by 
Justices Blackmun and Marshall, would have rejected both "selec-
tive" and "pure" prospectivity as not permitted by the constitu-
tion. Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist and Kennedy dissented. 
-17-
Bacchus Imports Ltd, v, Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 82 
L.Ed.2d 200 (1984). Both the trial court, a state court, and the 
Supreme Court of Georgia declared the challenged tax unconstitu-
tional and enjoined any future enforcement, but denied the liquor 
manufacturer's tax refund request holding that the ruling was to 
apply only prospectively. In Beam, the Court reversed the deci-
sion of the Georgia Supreme Court, holding that because the 
Bacchus case applied retroactively to the litigants in that case, 
the Bacchus rule would also have to be applied to the plaintiff 
in Beam, a similarly situated litigant. In so holding, the Court 
stated: 
Bacchus thus applied its own rule, just as if 
it had reversed and remanded without further 
ado, and yet of course the Georgia courts 
refused to apply that rule with respect to 
the litigants in this case. Thus, the ques-
tion is whether it is error to refuse to 
apply a rule of federal law retroactively 
after the case announcing the rule has 
already done so. We hold that it is, princi-
ples of equality and stare decisis here pre-
vailing over any claim based on a Chevron Oil 
analysis. 
Ill S. Ct. at 2446, 115 L.Ed.2d at 491. And further; 
Of course, retroactivity in civil cases must 
be limited by the need for finality, see 
Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter 
State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 84 L.Ed. 329, 60 S. 
Ct. 317 (1940); once suit is barred by res 
judicata or by statutes of limitation or 
repose, a new rule cannot reopen the door 
already closed. 
Ill S. Ct. at 2446, 115 L.Ed.2d at 492. 
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The Court's analysis in Beam is particularly apropos in 
this case. In Rio Algom. just as in Bacchus. the litigants had 
the ruling applied retroactively. In Rio Algom that ruling was 
applied to the Rio Algom plaintiffs in 1981, even though the 
decision that Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109 was unconstitutional was 
issued on March 13, 1984. Similarly, in this case, Kennecott 
sought to have that ruling applied to it for tax year 1983, two 
years after 1981, the year in which the Rio Algom plaintiffs were 
litigating their taxes. For the reasons enunciated in Beam, Rio 
Algom should not be read as foreclosing Kennecott's right to 
relief from the application of an unconstitutional statute in 
1983, when Kennecott is not only "similarly situated" to the Rio 
Algom plaintiffs, but had litigation pending over the exact issue 
6
 The Supreme Court of Washington in Robinson v. City of Seat-
tle. 119 Wash. 2d 34, , 830 P.2d 318, 342-43 (1992), adopted 
the Court's analysis and result in Beam when it rejected selec-
tive prospectivity. The Washington court stated: 
We are persuaded that the Beam Distilling 
holding is sound. While our decision in 
National Can relied in part on the Chevron 
Oil analysis, we now modify our rule from 
National Can in a manner consistent with the 
limitations on the Chevron Oil rule effected 
in Beam Distilling. We expressly limit our 
holding in this case to the abolishment of 
selective prospectivity in the application of 
our state appellate decisions. 
Id. 830 P.2d at 343. Utah should also reject selective 
prospectivity and sustain the trial court's decision in this 
case. 
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decided in Rio Algom at the time the decision in that case was 
issued. 
In Rio Algom the court expressed some concern that to 
apply its holding that Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109 was unconstitu-
tional could mean that "local governments will be subject to 
enormous financial and administrative burdens." Rio Algom. 681 
P.2d at 195, and further: "Local governments operate on very 
precise and often strained budgets . . . " Id. 
This concern is largely nonexistent in this case. 
Political subdivisions in Utah, including Salt Lake County, have 
specific authority to levy taxes to raise revenue in order to 
satisfy judgments rendered against them. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-27 (1989) specifically provides: 
(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to 
the contrary, all political subdivisions may 
levy an annual property tax sufficient to pay 
the following: 
(a) any claim; 
(b) any settlement; 
7
 The court in Rio Algom, at page 196, cites one other Utah 
case where "selective" prospectivity had been announced and 
applied. In Carter v. Beaver County Service Area No. 1, 16 Utah 
2d 280, 283, 399 P.2d 440, 442 (1965), the court granted a tax-
payer a declaratory judgment holding the County Service Area Act 
unconstitutional, but stating; "In so declaring we desire it to 
be understood that this ruling applies to the instant contro-
versy, and apart from this, the decision is to have prospective 
not retroactive effect.11 No damage relief, tax refund relief, or 
injunctive relief was sought by plaintiff in that case. Thus, 
the case may be more properly read as a "pure" prospectivity case 
since no other citizens1 rights were adversely impacted by the 
decision of prospectivity. 
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(c) any judgment, including any judg-
ment against an elected official or employee 
of any political subdivision, including peace 
officers, based upon a claim for punitive 
damages but the authority of a political sub-
division for the payment of any judgment for 
punitive damages is limited in any individual 
case to $10,000; 
(d) the cost to defend any claim, set-
tlement, or judgment; or 
(e) the establishment and maintenance 
of a reserve fund for the payment of claims, 
settlements or judgments as may be reasonably 
anticipated. 
(2) . . . No levy under this section may 
exceed .0001 per dollar of taxable value of 
taxable property. The revenues derived from 
this levy may not be used for any other pur-
pose than those stipulated in this section. 
Furthermore, to the extent a financial hardship may be 
imposed upon one of Utah's political subdivisions because of the 
need to refund taxes, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-25 (1989) specifi-
cally permits the payment of an "award" in installments. Thus 
the "hardship" expressed by the County is nonexistent, or at 
least, minimal. Certainly any "hardship" should not permit the 
County and the Commission to violate Kennecott's constitutional 
rights under Article XIII, Sections 2 and 3 of the Utah Constitu-
tion and then retain the funds extorted as a result of that vio-
lation. This is simply unconscionable, and as will be pointed 
out hereinbelow, will result in a separate violation of 
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Kennecott's rights to due process of law and equal protection 
Q 
under the United States and Utah constitutions. 
POINT II 
DENIAL OF RELIEF TO KENNECOTT RESPECTING ITS 
JANUARY 1, 1983 ASSESSMENT WILL VIOLATE KEN-
NECOTT1 S DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
RIGHTS UNDER THE UNITED STATES AND UTAH 
CONSTITUTIONS. 
Denying relief to Kesnnecott in this case will result in 
Kennecott being unable to obtain any relief from an unconstitu-
tional assessment. Consequently, such a denial will result in a 
separate violation of Kennecott's due process rights. This 
becomes clear when the recent decision of the United States 
Supreme Court in McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic 
8
 The County and the court may have some concern that a deci-
sion in Kennecott!s favor may result in a series of lawsuits by 
others over the unconstitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109. 
That concern is also addressed by Judge Souter in his Beam opin-
ion, where he stated that the retroactivity principle announced 
in Beam is necessarily limited by appropriate statutes of limita-
tion as well as the doctrine of res judicaita. In this situation, 
further litigation over Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109, supra, is 
highly unlikely. If a state assessed taxpayer believed his real 
property assessment by the Commission was unlawful because of 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-109, he would have had to bring that asser-
tion before the Commission within 30 days of having received his 
Notice of Assessment in 1981, 1982 or 1983. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-7-12 (1975). If that taxpayer decided to bring a tax pro-
test action challenging the taxes he paid as a result of an 
unconstitutional assessment, that action would have to have been 
brought within six months of the date the taxes were paid under 
protest, or before May 30, 1984 at the latest. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-31 (1992) and Ponderosa One Limited Partnership v. 
Salt Lake Suburban Sanitary Dist., 738 P.2d 635 (Utah 1987). 
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Beverages & Tobacco. 496 U.S. 18, 110 S. Ct. 2238, 110 L.Ed.2d 17 
(1990) is examined. 
In McKesson. Florida enacted an excise tax scheme for 
alcoholic beverages which granted preferential rates to certain 
citrus, grape and sugarcane products, all of which were commonly 
grown in Florida and used in alcoholic beverages produced in that 
state. McKesson Corp. ("McKesson"), a liquor distributor whose 
products did not qualify for the reduced tax rate, filed an 
application for a tax refund with the Florida Comptrollers 
office upon the grounds that the tax scheme was unlawful in vio-
lation of the commerce clause and the Court's decision in 
Bacchus. supra. 
The refund request was denied. McKesson then sued for 
the refund in a Florida state court. Eventually the Florida 
Supreme Court held the tax scheme unconstitutional and sustained 
an injunction against future enforcement of the preferred rate 
scheme, but refused to grant any refund or other relief for the 
taxes McKesson had already paid. In a unanimous decision, the 
United States Supreme Court reversed the Florida Supreme Court's 
refusal to order a tax refund, or grant other relief with respect 
to those taxes McKesson had already paid, holding that denying 
such relief violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
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In McKesson, the Court stated: 
It is undisputed that the Florida 
Supreme Court, after holding that the Liquor 
Tax unconstitutionally discriminated against 
interstate commerce because of its prefer-
ences for liquor made from "crops which Flor-
ida is adapted to growing," 524 So.2d, at 
1008, acted correctly in awarding petitioner 
declaratory amd injunctive relief against 
continued enforcement of the discriminatory 
provisions. The question before us is 
whether prospective relief, by itself, 
exhausts the requirements of federal law. 
The answer is no: if a State places a tax-
payer under duress promptly to pay a tax when 
due and relegaLtes him to a postpayment refund 
action in which he can challenge the tax's 
legality, the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment obligates the State to pro-
vide meaningful backward-looking relief to 
rectify any unconstitutional deprivation. 
496 U.S. at 31. And further: 
To satisfy the requirements of the Due Pro-
cess Clause, therefore, in this refund action 
the State must provide taxpayers with, not 
only a fair opportunity to challenge the 
accuracy and legal validity of their tax 
obligation, but also a "clear and certain 
remedy," TAtchison, T.&S.F.R. Co. v.1 
0' Connor. 223 U.S. at 285, 56 L.Ed. 436, 32 
S. Ct. 216, for any erroneous or unlawful tax 
collection to ensure that the opportunity to 
contest the tcix is a meaningful one. 
Had the Florida courts declared the Liquor 
Tax invalid either because (other than its 
discriminatory nature) it was beyond the 
State's power to impose, as was the 
unapportioned tax in O'Connor, or because the 
taxpayers were absolutely immune from the 
tax, as were the Indian Tribes in Ward and 
Carpenter, no corrective action by the State 
could cure the invalidity of the tax during 
the contested tax period. The State would 
have had no choice but to "undo" the unlawful 
deprivation by refunding the tax previously 
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paid under duress, because allowing the State 
to "collect these unlawful taxes by coercive 
means and not incur any obligation to pay 
them back . . . would be in contravention of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
496 U.S. at 39. 
In the circumstances presented in this case, Kennecott 
can only protest, or litigate, a Tax Commission assessment it 
believes to be unlawful pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-7-12 (Supp. 1986), which states: 
If the owner of any property assessed by the 
state tax commission or any county with a 
showing of reasonable cause objects to the 
assessment, either may, before the tenth day 
of April, apply to the commission for a hear-
ing. Both the owner or the county upon a 
showing of reasonable cause shall be allowed 
to be a party at any hearing under this 
section. 
The tax commission shall set a time for hear-
ing the objection from April 10 until April 
22. At the hearing the tax commission may 
increase, lower or sustain the assessment, if 
the commission finds an error in the assess-
ment or if it is necessary to equalize the 
assessment with out similarly assessed 
property. 
In Crystal Car Line v. State Tax Commission, 110 Utah 
426, 174 P.2d 984 (1946), this court held that a taxpayer whose 
personal property was assessed by the Commission could not chal-
lenge that assessment as unlawful, because it was fraudulent, in 
a declaratory judgment action respecting the legal ability of the 
Commission to assess and tax the taxpayer's property. The court 
held that any such challenge was required to be brought before 
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the Commission under the predecessor to Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-12, 
9 
supra. In so holding, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Plaintiffs further contend that: the assess-
ments of their cars were fraudulent per se 
because in their valuation no account was 
taken of their diverse ages but all were 
given the same valucition per car. We are not 
impressed with this argument in view of the 
fact that plaintiffs at no time before they 
commenced this action protested the valuation 
placed on their cars, as provid€>d for in Sec. 
80-7-12, U.C.A. 1943. Had any of the plain-
tiffs been of the opinion that their cars 
were being overvaluated they had an opportu-
nity under this section to apply to the com-
mission within the time allowed, to have the 
valuations corrected and they would have been 
entitled to ai hearing of the matter. This 
they did not do. . . . This court is commit-
ted to the view that in the absence of fraud 
or bad faith on the part of the assessor, his 
valuation is conclusive unless changed by the 
Board of Equalization on application of the 
taxpayer, and that this remedy which the leg-
islature had provided for the taxpayer is 
exclusive unless willfulness, arbitrariness, 
fraud or bad faith can be clearly shown. 
9 The text of Utah Code Ann. § 80-7-12 (1943), at the time of 
the Crystal Car Line decision, read as follows: 
If the owner of any property assessed by the 
State Tax Commission is dissatisfied with the 
assessment made by it, such owner may, 
between the third Monday in May and the sec-
ond Monday in June, apply to the Commission 
to have the same corrected in any particular, 
and it shall set a time for hearing such 
objections and may correct and increase or 
lower any assessment made by it, so as to 
equalize the same with the assessment of 
other property in the state. 
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174 P.2d at 991. 
Thus, when Kennecott determined that the assessment of 
its real property by the Commission was excessive and unlawful 
because of a rollback granted to locally assessed real property, 
but not to Kennecott's property, Kennecott's only recourse was to 
contest that assessment under Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-12, supra. 
This is exactly the course Kennecott pursued. 
Under McKesson, due process of law requires that a 
state give a taxpayer " . . . a fair opportunity to challenge the 
accuracy and legal validity of their tax obligation" and "a clear 
and certain remedy." 496 U.S. at 39. If this court does not 
sustain the trial court's determination that Kennecott was enti-
tled to challenge its assessment in 1983, but agrees with the 
County that Rio Alaom forecloses any remedy available to 
Kennecott for an assessment under a statute which was unconstitu-
tional in 1981, and also in 1983, then the Court will have denied 
Kennecott a "clear and certain remedy" which McKesson requires 
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must be available so that Kennecott's due process rights are not 
violated. 
The County may argue that McKesson doesn't apply in 
this case because the assessment Kennecott is challenging was 
unlawful as a result of Utah state, not federal law. That asser-
tion was addressed by the court in Smith v. Travis County Educa-
tion District, 791 F. Supp. 1170 (D. Tex. 1992), vacated on other 
grounds, 968 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1992). 
In Travis County, the court held that imposition of 
taxes which were violative of the Texas State Constitution con-
stituted a violation of the due process of law guarantees 
afforded taxpayers by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
United States Constitution. In so holding, the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Texas stated: 
As the State correctly argues, McKesson 
involved a tax that was held unconstitutional 
under the Commerce Clause of the United 
States Constitution. Consequently, the state 
proceeds to argue that McKesson should not be 
held to apply to state tax schemes that only 
violate state law. A distinction should be 
1 0
 The effect of the decision denying Kennecott any relief in 
this case is to deny Kennecott any relief whatsoever. Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-5-109, supra, was repealed by the Legislature following 
this court!s decision in Rio Alaom. Kennecott's right to relief 
in the tax protest action which is relcited to this assessment 
proceeding is entirely dependent upon the improper assessment of 
Kennecottfs property by the Commission due to the rollback stat-
ute. Thus, denial of a possibility of relief in this case fore-
closes any relief available to Kennecott in the tax protest case. 
See Kennecott Corp. v. S.L. County: Utah State Supreme Court Case 
No. 92-0286. 
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recognized, but perhaps a distinction should 
also be recognized between tax schemes that 
merely violate a state or local statute and 
tax schemes that violate a state's constitu-
tion. The basic issue is whether the State 
provides a remedy. The issue in the present 
action is the State's continued enforcement 
of a tax scheme that has been found unconsti-
tutional under the State constitution. Such 
a continued enforcement would violate the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution. 
791 F. Supp. at 1190-91. 
That this continued imposition of taxes violation of a 
state constitutional provision also constitutes a violation of 
federal due process was directly addressed in Travis County as 
follows: 
Once a state taxation scheme has been 
declared invalid under the state constitu-
tion, the taxpayers of that state must be 
given a substantive means to protest any pay-
ments of taxes incurred under such a scheme. 
A merely pro forma state remedy does not sat-
isfy the demands of due process under the 
United States Constitution. 
791 F.Supp. at 1203. 
The analysis of whether imposition of a tax unlawful 
under state law constitutes a violation of the federal constitu-
tion is similar to an analysis of a due process of law violation 
under Utah's Constitution. See Vali Convalescent & Care Inst, v. 
Industrial Comm'n. 649 P.2d 33 (Utah 1982) (Decisions relating to 
the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Consti-
tution are highly persuasive when interpreting the due process 
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clause of the Utah Constitution); Untermeyer v. State Tax Comm'n. 
102 Utah 214, 129 P.2d 881 (1942). Article I, Section 7 of the 
Utah Constitution, independent of federal constitutional guaran-
tees, protects Kennecott from any action of the Commission, the 
County, or another Utah government unit, including Utah's Legis-
lature, which results in a deprivation of Kennecott's property 
without due process of law. Kennecott submits that if this court 
does not sustain Judge Rigtrup's decision that Kennecott was 
entitled to challenge the Commission's assessment eis of January 
1, 1983, and also that Kennecott was entitled to a reduction in 
the assessed value of its property when Kennecott demonstrated 
that its assessment violated Article XIII, Sections 2 and 3 of 
the Utah Constitution, then Kennecott's due process rights under 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution will be violated. 
Not only does failure to grant Kennecott a remedy for 
the unconstitutional assessment of its property in 19 83 consti-
tute a violation of federal and state guarantees of due process 
of law, it also violates Kennecottfs equal protection rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution. 
As pointed out by the Court in Beam. " . . . similarly 
situated litigants should be treated the same, . . . " 111 S. 
Ct. at 2446, 115 L.Ed.2d at 491. See also. City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Center. Inc.. 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 
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87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) ("The Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment commands that no State shall 'deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,f which 
is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated 
should be treated alike."); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 
S. Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982) ("The Equal Protection Clause 
directs that fall persons similarly circumstanced shall be 
treated alike1"); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commis-
sion. 488 U.S. 336, 343-345, 109 S. Ct. 633, 102 L.Ed.2d 688 
(1989) (the Equal Protection Clause applies to taxation which 
bears unequally on persons or property of the same class). 
Furthermore, Beam held that "selective" prospectivity, 
i.e., selecting certain litigants to receive the benefit of a 
newly announced rule of law, while denying that benefit to all 
other litigants, violates the "rule of law." See. Ill S. Ct. at 
2447, 115 L.Ed.2d at 493. In this case, Kennecott had pending 
before the Commission its assessment challenge, as required if 
Kennecott desired to challenge its assessed value, at the time 
Rio Algom was decided. The fact that the Rio Algom plaintiffs 
had the good fortune to be before the Utah Supreme Court, whereas 
Kennecott was litigating the exact same issue before the Tax Com-
11 
mission, was purely fortuitous. 
1 1
 According to the Economist Style Guide, "fortuitous means 
accidental, not fortunate. or well-timed." The Economist Style 
Guide, p. 31, (1991), The Economist Books, Ltd. 
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Consequently, applying the Rio Alaom rule to the Rio 
Algom plaintiffs, but not to Kennecott, only because Kennecott 
was not one of the lucky six plaintiffs in Rio Alaom. is a wholly 
arbitrary distinction or classification, a completely accidental 
result. 
When the only distinction that can be drawn between 
"similarly situated litigants,11 some of whom receive the benefit 
of a ruling, i.e., the Rio Alaom plaintiffs, and others who do 
not receive any such benefit, i.e., Kennecott, is simply because 
of good fortune. or accident, the party left out in the cold has 
had its rights to equal protection under the law violated. The 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects 
Kennecott against just such an arbitrary and accidental result. 
Article I, Section 24, of Utah's Constitution also pro-
tects Kennecott from the result the County seeks in this case. 
In Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. State. 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 
1989) and Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Tax Commission. 796 P.2d 1256, 
1261 (Utah 1990) , the principle was established that a violation 
of Article I, Section 24, of Utah's Constitution would also be a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Kennecott submits that the converse is also true. Any 
violation of Kennecott's rights to equal protection of the law 
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
will also constitute ci violation of Kennecottfs rights under 
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Article I, Section 24 of Utah's Constitution because Utah's Con-
stitution provides more protection than the Fourteenth Amendment 
against arbitrary and unreasonable action by government units in 
Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
As is shown herein, Judge Rigtrup's decision in this 
case that Kennecott could maintain its action for an unlawful 
assessment by the Utah State Tax Commission in violation of Arti-
cle XIII, Sections 2 and 3 of Utah's Constitution was correct. 
To hold otherwise will violate the principles of stare decisis 
and the rule of law. Reversal of the trial court will also 
result in a violation of Kennecott's rights to due process of law 
and equal protection as guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 7 and 24 
of the Utah Constitution. Judge Rigtrup's decision should be 
sustained. 
Respectfully submitted this f9 day of October, 1992. 
7AMES B. LEE 
KENT W. WINTERHOLLER 
of and for 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
Kennecott Corporation 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
(801) 532-1234 
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IN THE TAX DIVISION OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
KENNECOTT CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner/ 
Appellant, 
vs. 
THE STATE TAX COMMISSION OF 
UTAH and SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
FINDINGS OF *"ACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ^JlIH^^H0l5SMEN?I^ 
Civil No. C85-8015 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
* * * * * * * * 
Plaintiff Kennecott Corporation's, (,/Kennecott,/) motion 
for summary judgment was heard by the court on October 28, 1991. 
Kennecott was represented at the hearing by its attorney Kent W. 
Winterholler of Parsons Behle & Latimer. Salt Lake County was 
represented by its attorney Bill Thomas Peters. Appearing at the 
hearing in behalf of the Utah State Tax Commission ("Tax Commis-
sion") was its attorney, Rick Carlton. At the conclusion of the 
hearing the court directed that the Tax Commission's record of 
the hearings held in this case before the Tax Commission, upon 
0GG65G 
which Kennecott's motion was based, be transmitted to the court. 
The order directing the transmission of this Tax Commission 
record was entered by the court on October 29, 1991. Thereafter, 
the court received the record of the Tax Commission's hearings in 
this appeal and review proceeding, and has reviewed the same. 
Kennecott and Salt Lake County both submitted memoranda of law 
respecting their positions in this proceeding. 
The court now having heard the arguments of counsel, 
having reviewed the respective memoranda of the parties, and hav-
ing reviewed the record of the proceedings held before the Tax 
Commission, and being fully advised in the premises, does hereby 
enter the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The total assessed value of Kennecott's property 
located in Salt Lake County, as assessed by the Property Tax 
Division of the Tax Commission as of January 1, 1983, was 
$136,449,995. Included in that assessment was $5,924,084 
assigned to land and $39,731,840 assigned to buildings and 
improvements. This total Kennecott real property assessed value 
of $45,655,924 represents twenty (20) percent of the fair market 
value of Kennecott's land, buildings and improvements as deter-
mined by the Tax Commission pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-57 
(Supp. 1983). 
-2-
2. The total Tax Commission assessed value of 
$45,655,924 assigned to real property did not include any assess-
ment for Kennecott's mine and mining claims as of January 1, 
1983. 
3. The Utah State Tax Commission used the comparable 
sales method of valuation, or market approach to value, for its 
valuation of Kennecott's land included in the real property 
assessment of $45,655,924. The Tax Commission in assessing the 
buildings and improvements included in Kennecott's real property 
assessment of $45,685,294 used a cost approach to value, or a 
replacement cost new less depreciation methodology, based upon 
the Marshall & Swift Cost Manual. 
4. Salt Lake County used the same valuation methodol-
ogies in assessing locally assessed commercial and industrial 
land and improvements as of January 1, 1983, as was used by the 
Tax Commission in assessing Kennecott's real property as of Janu-
ary 1, 1983. Both the comparable sales method of valuation, or 
the market approach, as well as the cost approach valuation 
method used by both the Tax Commission and Salt Lake County for 
1983 are used to arrive at fair market values and both methods 
account for inflation or deflation as these factors may affect 
the fair market value of real property. 
5. In 1983 Salt Lake County reduced the assessed 
value of land and improvements assessed by the Salt Lake County 
0QGSS3 
Assessor by a factor of 1.4 to roll back these land and improve-
ment values to 1978 levels pursuant to the provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-5-109 (Supp. 1983). 
6. Kennecott's real property assessment as accom-
plished by the Tax Commission was not reduced by the 1.4 factor, 
or rolled back to 1978 levels by the Tax Commission, in assigning 
an assessed value to Kennecott's real property of $4 5,655,924. 
If the Tax Commission had applied the same roll back factor to 
Kennecott's real property as was assigned by the Salt Lake County 
Assessor's office to locally assessed real property, so as to 
reduce the assessed value of Kennecott's real property, the total 
assessment of Kennecott's centrally assessed property as of Janu-
ary 1, 1983 would have been $123,405,445. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court 
hereby makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Because the Salt Lake County Assessor rolled back 
the value of locally cissessed real property by a factor of 1.4, 
which real property was assessed by the same methodology as was 
Kennecott's centrally assessed real property as of January 1, 
1983, comparable locally assessed real property in Salt Lake 
County was undervalued by a factor of 1.4 in relation to Kenne-
cott's centrally assessed property as of January 1, 1983. 
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2. In order to equalize the valuation of Kennecott's 
centrally assessed property with the assessed value of comparable 
locally assessed property, Kennecott's real property should have 
its assessed value rolled back by a factor of 1.4. This results 
in an assessed value for Kennecott's centrally assessed property 
located in Salt Lake County as of January 1, 1983 of 
$123,405,445. 
3. The records of the Utah State Tax Commission and 
of the Salt Lake County Treasurer, Auditor and Assessor shall be 
corrected so as to reflect that the total assessed value of Ken-
necott 's centrally assessed property located in Salt Lake County 
as of January 1, 1983 shall be $123,405,445. 
4. The September 5, 1991 and October 25, 1991 orders 
of the Tax Commission are amply supported by the evidence 
contained in the Tax Commission's record of these proceedings. 
The court's de novo, independent review of the record satisfies 
the court that Kennecott has demonstrated to the court and the 
Tax Commission, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Tax 
Commission's orders of September 5, 1991 and October 25, 1991 
should be, and hereby are, affirmed in their entirety. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Judgment is hereby awarded in favor of Kennecott reduc-
ing the assessed value of Kennecott's centrally assessed property 
located in Salt Lake County as of January 1, 1983 from the 
- 5 - * . • • - --» 
assessed value originally assigned by the Utah State Tax Commis-
sion of $136,449,995, to the Tax Commission assessed value as 
reflected and stated in the Utah State Tax Commission's Order of 
September 5, 1991 of $123,405,445. 
DATED this %$ ~day of February, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGEl KENNETH RI 
District Court Jiidge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT to the following on 
this /j/JL day of fZ>/s<saL+xJ \W2\ 
Bill Thomas Peters, Special Deputy 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Rick Carlton 
Asst. Utah State Attorney General 
Tax & Business Regulation Division 
36 South State Street, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
^ 2 2 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
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-6-
-•-% f\ ***• '*' .*"*. "T 
- i rv^ c V !'• 
ADDENDUM B 
AMENDMENTS Amend. XIV, § 3 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
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Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
History: Proposed by Congress on June 16, 
1866; declared to have been ratified by three-
fourths of all the states on July 28, 1868. 
AMENDMENT XV 
Section Section 
1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not 2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
to disqualify.] 
Section 1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not to 
disqualify.] 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude. 
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legisla-
tion. 
History: Proposed by Congress on February more than three-fourths of all the states on 
27, 1869; declared to have been ratified by March 30, 1870. 
AMENDMENT XVI 
[Income tax.] 
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes., from 
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, 
and without regard to any census or enumeration. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Mootness Ques-
tion in Habeas Corpus Proceedings Where Pe-
titioner Is Released Prior to Final Adjudica-
tion, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 265. 
Habeas Corpus and the In-Service Conscien-
tious Objector, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 328. 
Post-Conviction Procedure Act: Limitation 
on Habeas Corpus?, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 595. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Cor-
pus §§ 5 to 7. 
C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law 
§ 472 et seq.; 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 5. 
A.L.R. — Anticipatory relief in federal 
courts against state criminal prosecutions 
growing out of civil rights activities. 8 
A.L.R.3d 301. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law <s=> 
83H)| 121 to 123. 
Sec- 6. [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and 
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful 
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legisla-
ture from defining the lawful use of arms. 
History: Const. 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.), 
S.J.R. 3. 
Compilers Notes. — Laws 1983, Senate 
Joint Resolution No. 2, proposing to amend 
this section, was repealed by Senate Joint Res-
olution No. 3, Laws 1984 "(2nd S.S.), § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Prospective application. 
Regulation of right to bear arms. 
Prospective application. 
The amendment to this provision by Laws 
1984 (2nd S.S.), Senate Joint Resolution No. 3 
is to be given prospective application only. 
State v. Wacek, 703 P.2d 296 (Utah 1985). 
Regulation of right to bear arms. 
This section gives sufficient authority for the 
legislature to forbid the possession of danger-
ous weapons by those who are not citizens, or 
who have been convicted of crimes, or who are 
addicted to drugs, or who are mentally incom-
petent. State v. Beorchia. 530 P.2d 813 (Utah 
1974). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Individual Right 
to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?, 
1986 Utah L. Rev. 751. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons 
and Firearms § 4. 
C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law 
§ 511; 94 C.J.S. Weapons § 2. 
A.L.R. — Gun control laws, validity and 
construction of, 28 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Validity of statute proscribing possession or 
carrying of knife, 47 A.L.R.4th 651. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law «=> 82; 
Weapons <§= 1, 3, 6 et seq. 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
History: Const 1896. 
Cross-References. — Eminent domain gen-
erally, § 78-34-1 et seq. 
64 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS Art. I, § 24 
project did not unconstitutionally grant bene- mination of urban blight. Tribe v. Salt Lake 
fits to private individuals; any benefits were City Corp., 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975). 
strictly incidental to the public purpose of ter-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 36 Am. Jur. 2d Franchises C.J.S. — 37 C.J.S. Franchises § 26. 
§§ 9 to 23. Key Numbers. — Franchises *=» 11. 
Sec, 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
History: Const. 1896. vate or special laws, Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 
Cross-References. — Prohibition on pri- 26. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
In general. 
Age of majority. 
Agent for service of process. 
Automobile license law. 
Construction with Art. VI, § 26. 
Contract carrier permit. 
Cosmetologists' license law. 
Criminal actions. 
—Investigations. 
—Prosecution. 
—Sentence. 
Criminal sentence. 
Disparate tax assessments. 
Excess revenue refunds. 
Guest statutes. 
Inheritance Tax Law. 
Insurance premium tax exemption. 
Intoxicating liquor. 
Licenses. 
Massage parlor ordinance. 
Municipal employment prerequisites. 
Notice requirements. 
Property. 
—Responsibility for water service. 
Public employees' retirement system. 
Public officers' bonds. 
Public officers' salaries. 
Road poll tax. 
School activities. 
Search warrants. 
Sunday closing laws. 
Tax sales. 
Unfair Practices Act. 
In general. 
All laws shall operate uniformly wherever 
uniform laws can be enacted. State v. 
Holtgreve, 58 Utah 563, 200 P. 894, 26 A.L.R. 
696 (1921). 
Objects and purposes of law present touch-
stone for determining proper and improper 
classifications. State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 
P.2d 920,117 A.L.R. 330 (1938); State v. J.B. & 
R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 
(1941). 
One who assails legislative classification as 
arbitrary has burden of proving it to be such. 
State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 
523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
Classification is never unreasonable or arbi-
trary in its inclusion or exclusion features so 
long as there is some basis for differentiation 
between classes or subject matters included, as 
compared to those excluded, provided differen-
tiation bears reasonable relation to purposes of 
act. State v. J.B. & RE. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 
523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
Before legislative enactment can be inter-
fered with, court must be able to say that there 
is no fair reason for the law that would not 
require equally its extension to those which it 
leaves untouched. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, 
Inc., 100 Utah 523. 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
Only where some persons or transactions ex-
cluded from operation of law are, as to the sub-
ject matter of the law, in no differentiable class 
from those included in its operation, is the law 
discriminatory in the sense of being arbitrary 
and unconstitutional, and if reasonable basis 
to differentiate can be found, law must be held 
constitutional. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, 
Inc.. 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 (194D. 
Inability of legislature to make perfect clas-
sification does not render statute unconstitu-
tional. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 
Utah 523. 116 P.2d 766 (1941). 
In determining whether classification made 
by legislature is unconstitutional, discrimina-
tion is very essence of classification and is not 
objectionable unless founded upon unreason-
able distinctions. Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, 
113 Utah 284, 194 P.2d 464 (1948). 
An act is never unconstitutional because of 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Bond issue. invalid as attempting to fix fiscal year other 
City ordinance authorizing bond issue for than that provided by this section. Fjeldsted v. 
improvement of waterworks and specifying Ogden City, 83 Utah 278, 28 P.2d 144 (1933); 
that for purpose of servicing bonds fiscal year Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321, 28 
should continue same as calendar year was not P.2d 161 (1933). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 357. 
Key Numbers. — Taxation *= 318. 
Sec. 2. [Tangible property to be taxed — Value ascer-
tained — Exemptions — Remittance or abate-
ment of taxes of poor — Intangible property — 
Legislature to provide annual tax for state.] 
(1) All tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the 
United States, or under this Constitution, shall be taxed at a uniform and 
equal rate in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law. 
(2) The following are property tax exemptions: 
(a) The property of the state, school districts, and public libraries; 
(b) The property of counties, cities, towns, special districts, and all 
other political subdivisions of the state, except that to the extent and in 
the manner provided by the Legislature the property of a county, city, 
town, special district or other political subdivision of the state located 
outside of its geographic boundaries as defined by law may be subject to 
the ad valorem property tax; 
(c) Property owned by a nonprofit entity which is used exclusively for 
religious, charitable or educational purposes; 
(d) Places of burial not held or used for private or corporate benefit; and 
(e) Farm equipment and farm machinery as defined by statute. This 
exemption shall be implemented over a period of time as provided by 
statute. 
(3) Tangible personal property present in Utah on January 1, m., which is 
held for sale or processing and which is shipped to final destination outside 
this state within twelve months may be deemed by law to have acquired no 
situs in Utah for purposes of ad valorem property taxation and may be ex-
empted by law from such taxation, whether manufactured, processed or pro-
duced or otherwise originating within or without the state. 
(4) Tangible personal property present in Utah on January 1, m., held for 
sale in the ordinary course of business and which constitutes the inventory of 
any retailer, or wholesaler or manufacturer or farmer, or livestock raiser may 
be deemed for purposes of ad valorem property taxation to be exempted. 
(5) Water rights, ditches, canals, reservoirs, power plants, pumping plants, 
transmission lines, pipes and flumes owned and used by individuals or corpo-
rations for irrigating land within the state owned by such individuals or 
corporations, or the individual members thereof, shall be exempted from taxa-
tion to the extent that they shall be owned and used for such purposes. 
(6) Power plants, power transmission lines and other property used for 
generating and delivering electrical power, a portion of which is used for 
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furnishing power for pumping water for irrigation purposes on lands in the 
state of Utah, may be exempted from taxation to the extent that such property 
is used for such purposes. These exemptions shall accrue to the benefit of the 
users of water so pumped under such regulations as the Legislature may 
prescribe. 
(7) The taxes of the poor may be remitted or abated at such times and in 
such manner as may be provided by law. 
(8) The Legislature may provide by law for the exemption from taxation: of 
not to exceed 45?f of the fair market value of residential property as defined 
by law; and all household furnishings, furniture, and equipment used exclu-
sively by the owner thereof at his place of abode in maintaining a home for 
himself and family. 
(9) Property owned by disabled persons who served in any war in the mili-
tary service of the United States or of the state of Utah and by the unmarried 
widows and minor orphans of such disabled persons or of persons who while 
serving in the military service of the United States or the state of Utah were 
killed in action or died as a result of such service may be exempted as the 
Legislature may provide. 
(10) Intangible property may be exempted from taxation as property or it 
may be taxed as property in such manner and to such extent as the Legisla-
ture may provide, but if taxed as property the income therefrom shall not also 
be taxed. Provided that if intangible property is taxed as property the rate 
thereof shall not exceed five mills on each dollar of valuation. 
(11) The Legislature shall provide by law for an annual tax sufficient, with 
other sources of revenue, to defray the estimated ordinary expenses of the 
state for each fiscal year. For the purpose of paying the state debt, if any there 
be, the Legislature shall provide for levying a tax annually, sufficient to pay 
the annual interest and to pay the principal of such debt, within twenty years 
from the final passage of the law creating the debt. 
History: Const. 1896; L. 1930 (Spec. Sess.), 
S.J.R. 2; 1945, H.J.R. 3; 1957, H.J.R. 7; 1961, 
S.J.R. 6; 1963, S.J.R. 5; 1967, S.J.R. 1; 1982, 
S.J.R. 3; 1986, H.J.R. 18. 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1959, Senate 
Joint Resolution No. 5 proposed a constitu-
tional amendment to be voted on by the elec-
tors at the general election in 1960. The pro-
posed amendment failed to pass because it did 
not receive the necessary majority. 
The 1979 proposed amendments to this sec-
tion by House Joint Resolutions Nos. 23 and 25 
were repealed and withdrawn by Senate Joint 
Resolution No. 6, Laws 1980. 
Laws 1986, Senate Joint Resolution No. 4, 
proposed to amend Subsection (2)(c) of this sec-
tion. The proposed amendment was submitted 
to the electors at the general election in 1986 
and failed to pass because it did not receive the 
necessary majority. 
Cross-References. — Armories exempt 
from taxation, § 39-2-1. 
Civil Air Patrol equipment exempt, § 2-1-41. 
County service area property exempt, 
§ 17A-2-429. 
Disabled veteran's exemption, §§ 59-2-1104,, 
59-2-1105. 
Exemptions generally, § 59-2-1101 et seq., 
Chapter 23 of Title 78. 
Indigent persons, abatement or deferral of 
taxes, §§ 59-2-1107 to 59-2-1109. 
Industrial facilities development property 
exempt, § 11-17-10. 
Mine and mining claim improvements, ma-
chinery or structures not exempt, § 59-5-64. 
Privilege tax on possession and use of tax-
exempt properties, § 51-4-101. 
Property of higher education institutions ex-
empt, § 53B-20-106. 
Property tax relief, § 59-2-1201 et seq. 
Rate of assessment of property, § 59-2-103 
School property exempt from taxation, 
§ 53A-3-408. 
Tangible personal property held for sale on 
January 1 exempt, § 59-2-1114. 
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-ty, and assessment based thereon was in 
^.. .«uon of this section. Harmer v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 324,, 452 P.2d 876 (1969). 
ed in Salt Lake County v. Tax Comm'n 
t* . c i . Utah Transit Auth., 780 P.2d 1231 
Utah Law Review. — Note, Financing1 
Modernized and Unmodernized Local Goveni-
ment in the Age of Aquarius. 1971 I ' t-
Rev. 30. 
Housing in Salt Lake County • A Place i 
Live for the Poor?, 1972 Utah L. Rev. 19.3 
Brigham Young Law Review. — A Muni' 
ipality's Interest in an Electrical Power Gene -
ating Facility: Some Tax Considerations, x * 
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 125 
Am. Jur. 2d, - 71 Am. Jur. 2d St in .-MI 
Local Taxation §§ 194 et seq., 307 et seq 
C.J.S. — 84 C.J.S. Taxation §§ 52, 57 et 
seq,, 215 et seq. 
History : Const 1896; Nov , 6, 1900; Nov, 6, 
1906; L. 1930 (S..S ) S.J.R. 2; 1946 (1st S.S.), 
H.J.R. 2; 1967', S.J.R. 2; 1982, S.J.R. 3. 
Compiler 's Notes. - - The 1979 proposed 
amendment of this section by Hoi ise Jo i nt Res 
ANALYSIS 
In general. 
"According to value in money" construed 
Charitable association. 
Co-operative corporation property. 
County clerk's probate fees. 
County improvement district contingent \.a\. 
Disparity in state .i"-4 *•- *lt, .^-x-^rnf "• 
Double taxation. 
Drainage assessments. 
•  (I It i ii 1989); Salt Lake County ex rel. County 
i  Bd. of Equalization v. State Tax Comm'n ex 
' > • rel. Kemiecott Corp., 779 P.2d 1131 (Utah 
1989). 
A.L.R. — Oil and gas royalty as real or per-
sonal property, 56 A.L.R.4th 539. 
Property taxi effect of tax-exempt lessor's re-
nary interest on valuation of nonexempt 
- interest, 57 A.L.R.4th 950. 
on from real-property taxation of 
facilities maintained by hospital for 
t .II, or others, 61 A.L.R.4th 1105. 
," of federal court's ordering state or 
oca tax increase to effectuate civil rights de-
vret 76 A.L.R. Fed. 504. 
Key Numbers. — Taxation «= 49, 57 et seq., 
5, olution No. 23 was repca.ea ai,u *,.;-.j-avn by 
), Senate Joint Resolution No. 6. Laws 1980. 
Cross-References. — Uniform School 
d Fund, taxes allocated to, § 53A-16-101. 
( ) c c u p a t i o n and license tax e s. 
RemJSSJon of taxes of indigent or insane per-
sons. 
Road poll taxes. 
Roll-back of assessed value. 
Special assessments. 
State property. 
Telephone license tax. 
Uniformity and equality. 
Utility rates. 
Cited. 
COI I -A I ERAI REFERENCES 
S I T -I! [ Assessment and taxation of tangible property • -
Livestock — Land used for agricultural pur-
poses.,] 
(] ) The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of assess-
ment on all tangible property in the state, according to its value in money, 
ex-<>pt as otherwise provided in Section 2 of this Article. The Legislature shall 
}.-. -cribe by law such provisions as shall secure a just valuation for taxation 
of such property, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in 
proportion to the value of his, her, or its tangible property, provided that the 
Legislature may determine the manner and extent of taxing livestock, 
(2) Land used for agricultural purposes may, as the Legislature prescribes, 
be assessed according to its value for agricultural use without regard to the 
value it may have for other purposes. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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Art. XIII, § 4 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 4. [Mines and claims to be assessed — Basis and mul-
tiple — What to be assessed as tangible property.] 
All metalliferous mines or mining claims, both placer and rock in place, 
shall be assessed as the Legislature shall provide; but the basis and multiple 
now used in determining the value of metalliferous mines for taxation pur-
poses and the additional assessed value of $5.00 per acre thereof shall not be 
changed before January 1, 1935, nor thereafter until otherwise provided by 
law. All other mines or mining claims and other valuable mineral deposits, 
including lands containing coal or hydrocarbons and all machinery used in 
mining and all property or surface improvements upon or appurtenant to 
mines or mining claims, and the value of any surface use made of mining 
claims, or mining property for other than mining purposes, shall be assessed 
as other tangible property. 
History: Const. 1896; Nov. 8, 1908; L. 1930 
(S.S.), S.J.R. 5; 1982, S.J.R. 3. 
ANALYSIS 
Construction and operation of section. 
Drain tunnels. 
Notice. 
Unpatented mining claims. 
Water rights. 
Construction and operation of section. 
Classification under this section as it for-
merly read was not intended to limit phrase 
"or other valuable mineral deposits," but em-
braced all mineral deposits including gypsum, 
and net annual profits from products manufac-
tured therefrom were taxable. Nephi Plaster & 
Mfg. Co. v. Juab County, 33 Utah 114, 93 P. 
53, 14 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1043 (1907). 
Under this section as it once read, a blanket 
assessment of all coal lands in county could not 
be made at a flat or uniform rate. Ririe v. Ran-
dolph, 51 Utah 274, 169 P. 941 (1917). 
Under this section as it formerly read, it was 
held that for purpose of taxing net proceeds of 
mines, the cost of mining incurred in any one 
year must be considered independently from 
the cost incurred in any other year, and only 
such costs as were incurred during year in 
which net proceeds were obtained could be con-
sidered. Mammoth Mining Co. v. Juab County, 
51 Utah 316, 170 P. 78 (1918). 
Cross-References. — Statutory- provisions, 
§ 59-2-201. 
Drain tunnels. 
Under this section, drain tunnels, used to 
drain a mine, may not be separately taxed 
where it appears that they have no separate 
and independent value, but are inseparably 
connected with the operation of the mine. 
Ontario Silver Mining Co. v. Hixon, 49 Utah 
359. 164 P. 498 (1917). 
Notice. 
Assessment of mines was not defective 
where notice described property with reason-
able certainty as to locality and identity. Con-
solidated Uranium Mines, Inc. v. Moffitt, 257 
F.2d 396 (10th Cir. 1958). 
Unpatented mining claims. 
A tax imposed under state law upon the pos-
sessory right to explore and develop mines lo-
cated upon unpatented claims located upon 
land belonging to the unappropriated public 
domain of the United States is not open to chal-
lenge upon the ground that it constitutes a tax 
against property belonging to the United 
States. Consolidated Uranium Mines, Inc. v. 
Moffitt, 257 F.2d 396 (10th Cir. 1958). 
Water rights. 
Water rights are taxable whether considered 
appurtenant to mine or independent property. 
Utah Metal & Tunnel Co. v. Groesbeck, 62 
Utah 251, 219 P. 248 (1923). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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59-5-1 
CHAPTER 5 
ASSESSMENT OF PROPERTY 
Article 
1. Gei icral provisions. 
2 Assessment by county assessor. 
4 Duties of county assessor. 
6. Assessment by state tax commission. 
7. Mining occupation tax. 
8. Farmland assessment act of 1969. 
9. Administration of property tax assessment. 
10. Real property plat map. 
GE\KK\I I KUYJSIONS 
Sor tion 
r»" I '* i I R; 11 e o f a s s e s s i i I e n 1: o f p r o p e :r t i I 11 n e 11 i e e d c o m p u t a t i o n s. 
59-5-1. Rate of assessment of property School district unmet need corn 
putations. All taxable property, not specifically exempt under Article XIII, section 
2, of the Constitution of Utah, must be assessed at 2fr%- 20% of its reasonable fair 
cash value. Land and the improvements thereon must be separately assessed, 
School district unmet need computations for critical school building aid shall be 
determined as though the bonding capacity had not been increased because of 
changes in the assessment rate, 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, §2506; Compiler's Notes, 
C.L. 1917, §5866; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 80-5-1; The 1979 amendment reduced the 
L. 1947, ch. 102, § 1; 1961, ch. 142, § 1; 1979, assessment rate from 30% to 25%; and added 
ch. 213, § 1; 1981, ch. 231, § 2. the last sentence. 
ARTICI ,E 2 
ASSESSMENT BY COUNTY ASSESSOR 
Section 
59-5-4 (icneral duties of county assessors • Election by taxpayer for assessment of goods 
at average value — Assessing interstate carriers. 
59-5-4.5. Assessor to recognize certain expenses in valuing property — Percentage limitation 
59-5-6. Report of valuation of taxable value of property to municipal ai it.horit.ies 
59-5-4. General duties of county assessors — Election by taxpayer for 
assessment of goods at average value — Assessing interstate carriers. The 
county assessor must, before t-h-e fifteenth day of A-priJ the first day of June of each 
year, ascertain the names of all taxable inhabitants and all property in the county 
subject to taxation except such as is required to be assessed by the state tax com-
mission and must assess s«eh the property to the person by who.ni, it was owned 
or claimed, or in whose possession or control it was, at 12 o'clock m. of the first 
day of January next preceding, and at its value on that date; provided that the 
owner of any stock, of goods, inventory, or other accumulation of personal property 
which may tend to-vary in quantity or value from day to day, may elect to have 
sttieh the personal property assessed on, tl ic basis of the average value thereof 
6 
UxJ-U"l 11 
The state tax commission \s authorized to incur by agreement up to 50% of the 
expense of such services from its own appropriation. 
History: L. 1969, ch. 179, §3; 1970, ch. 9, 
§2; 1981, ch. 233, § 1. 
59-5-109. Real property valuations to be rolled back to 1978 levels. All 
locally assessed taxable real property shall be appraised at current fair market 
value and the value of such property rolled back to its January 1, 1978, level as 
such level is determined by the state tax commission. 
History: C. 1953, 59-5409, enacted by L. providing that annual studies between the 
1981, ch. 233, § 2. assessed value and market value of each type 
of taxable property within taxing districts be 
Compiler's Notes. conducted by the state tax commission. 
Laws 1981, ch. 233, § 2 repealed old section This act amends section 59-5-108, Utah 
59-5-109 (L. 1969, ch. 179, §4; 1979, ch. 211, Code Annotated 1953, as last amended by 
§1), relating to revaluation of property, and chapter 9, Laws of Utah 1970; and repeals 
enacted new section 59-5-109. and reenacts section 59-5-109, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as last amended by chapter 
Title of Act. 211, Laws of Utah 1979, and section 
An act relating to revenue and taxation; 59-5-109.6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
providing for taxable real property enacted by chapter 224, Laws of Utah 1977. 
valuations to be rolled back to 1978 levels; — Laws 1981, ch. 233. 
59-5-109.5. Repealed. 
Repeal. to the initial program, was repealed by Laws 
Section 59-5-109.5 (L. 1977, ch. 216, §1), 1979, ch. 211, §2. 
relating to revaluational programs additional 
59-5-109.6. Assessment-sales ratio studies authorized — Adjustment or 
factoring o£ assessment rates by counties. (1) Each year, to assist it in the 
adjustment and equalization of valuation and assessment of taxable real property, 
the state tax commission shall conduct and publish the results of studies of the 
relationship between the assessed and market values of property to determine 
assessment-sales ratios for each type of taxable real property within taxing dis-
tricts. Assessors may provide sales information. 
(2) The state tax commission shall, before December 1 of each even-numbered 
year, order each county to adjust or factor its assessment rates using the most 
current studies so that the assessment rate in each county is in accordance with 
that prescribed in section 59-5-1. Such adjustment or factoring may include an 
entire county, geographical areas within a county and separate classes of 
properties. The state tax commission shall also order corrective action where sig-
nificant value deviations occur as indicated by the coefficient of dispersion. 
History: C. 1953, 59-5-109.6, enacted by L. Compiler's Notes. 
1981, ch. 233, § 3. Laws 1981, ch. 233, § 3 repealed old section 
59-5-109.6 (L. 1977,, ch. 224, §1), relating to 
assessment-sales ratio studies, and enacted 
new section 59-5-109.6. 
59-5-111. Limitation of levies against assessed property values — 
Exceptions — Election procedures — "Taxing district" defined. (1) Prior to 
the imposition of property tax mill levies against ivew assessed property values 
incorporated onto the tax rolls of any county of 10% or more as the result of any 
revaluation program conducted pursuant to section 59-5-109 or ajiy adjustments 
17 
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A R T I C L E 2 
I ,\ 11, I ,v ,\ i O M M I S S I O N 
Sectioi. *M'^  t i t 
59-7-12. 
IUI application to annvl tu 
cessment — Hearings. 
.•ligations by tax commission 
— Assessment of escaped 
Time for application 
Hearings. 
-•{•oil} - Increase or de-
* as»- uf assessed valuation, 
u/atnn based on reports of 
i'unt\ auditors. 
i f S S I t i r i l ! 
If the owner of any property assessed by the state tax commission or any 
county with a showing of reasonable cause o'bjects to the assessment, either 
may, before the tenth day of April, apply to the commission for a hearing. 
Both the owner or the county upon a showing of reasonable cause shall be 
allowed to be a party at any hearing under this section 
The tax commission shall set a time for hearing the objection from April 
10 until April 22. At the hearing the tax commission may increase, lower or 
sustain the assessment, if the commission finds an error in the assessment 
or if it is necessary to equalize the assessment with other similarly assessed 
property. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2563; 
L. 1909, ch. 63, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 5926; L. 
1931, ch. 53, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
80-7-12; I , 1982, ch 71, § 41; 1983, ch. 278, 
§ 1, 
Compiler's Notes. - The 1982 
ment substituted "before the tenth —„, ... 
April" for "between the third Monday in May 
and the second Monday in June"; and in-
serted "between the tenth day of April and 
•venty-second day of April, inclusive." 
:*; 1983 amendment rewrote this section 
which read: "If the owner of any property as-
sessed by the state tax commission is dissat-
isfied with the assessment made by it, such 
owner may, before the tenth day of April, 
, . i * * i i i e ^ » . 
' -
 v,i iHU*H in any pair ,tlai, and it shall set 8 
time for hearing such objections, between the 
tenth day of April and the twenty-second day 
of April, inclusive, and may correct and in-
crease or lower any assessment made by it, so 
us to equalize the same with the assessment 
if • ther property in the state." 
Burden of 'taxpayer. 
In protesting an assessment, taxpayer not 
only must show substantial error or impro-
priety in the assessment, but also must pro-
vide a sound evidentiary basis upon which 
the commission could adopt a lower valua-
tion, Utah Power & Light Co. v Utah S^t 
Ta x Coram, (1979) 590 P 2d 332. 
59-7-13. Investigations by tax commission Assess-
ment " i scaped property — Increase or de-
crease of assessed valuation. 
Each
 iyi*iji" the State Tax Commission shall conduct an Investigation" 
throughout each county of the state to determine whether all property 
subject lo taxation is on the assessment rolls, and whether such property is 
86 
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59-11-13. 
59-11-16. 
59-11-17. 
ment for recovery — Pay-
ment. 
Repealed. 
Rate of interest. 
Date falling on other than work 
day. 
History; C. 1953, 59-10-70, enacted by L. 1933 & C. 1943, 80-10-73; L. 1969, ch. 206, 
1974, ch. 27, § 16. § 30), relating to the county auditor's report 
C o m p i l e r s Notes . - Laws 1974, ch. 27, to the state auditor, and enacted new section 
§ 16 repealed old section 59-10-70 (R.S. 1898 59-10-70 
& C.L. 1907, § 2665; C.L. 1917, § 6066; R.S. 
CHAPTER 11 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
Section Section 
59-11-1. Examinat ion of books of county 
officers by state officers. 
59-11-11. Payment under protest — Action 
to recover. 
59-11-12. Payment under protest — Judg-
59-11-1. Examination of books of county officers by 
state officers* 
The state auditor, as well as any member of the state tax commission, or 
any person designated by them, may examine the books of any officer 
charged with the collection and receipt of state taxes. 
History: R S . 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2670; ment deleted "of the state board of examiners 
C.L. 1917, $ 6080; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, or" before "of the state tax commission"; and 
80-11-1; L. 1983, ch. 320, § 3 7 .
 m a d e a minor change in punctuation. 
Compiler's Notes . — The 1983 amend-
59-11-10. Illegal tax or license — Injunction, etc. 
Constitutionality of tax. in a district court pursuant to this section or 
The constitutionality or legality of the tax 59-11-11. State Tax Comm. v. Wright (1979) 
s ta tu tes may be raised as issues in an action 596 P 2d 634. 
59-11-11. Payment under protest — Action to recover. 
In all cases of levy of taxes, licenses, or other demands for public revenue 
which is deemed unlawful by the party whose property is thus taxed, or 
from whom such tax or license is demanded or enforced, such party may 
pay under protest such tax or license, or any part thereof deemed unlawful, 
to the officers designated and authorized by law to collect the same; and 
thereupon the party so paying or his legal representative may bring an 
action in the tax division of the appropriate district court against the officer 
to whom said tax or license was paid, or against the state, county, munici-
pality or other taxing unit on whose behalf the same was collected, to 
recover said tax or license or any portion thereof paid under protest. 
134 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 59-11-12 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, $ 2684; 
C.L. 1917, § 6094; R.S. 1933 & C 1943, 
80-11-11; L. 1977, ch. 80, 5 3. 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1977 amend-
ment substituted "the tax division of the ap-
propriate district court** for "any court of 
competent jurisdiction." 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality of tax. 
Payment under section not necessary. 
Sewer connection fee. 
Standing. 
Constitutionality of tax. 
The constitutionality or legality of the tax 
s ta tu tes may be raised as issues in an action 
in a district court pursuant to this section or 
59-11-10. State Tax Comm. v. Wright (1979) 
596 P 2d 634. 
P a y m e n t under section not necessary. 
Where owners were improperly taxed, it 
was not necessary to pay under protest and 
be put to expense of lawsuit until administra-
tive remedies were exhausted. Baker v. Tax 
Comm. (1974) 520 P 2d 203. 
S e w e r connect ion fee. 
Termination, without hearing, of water 
service to city residents who failed to pay ini-
tial sewer connection fee pursuant to ordi-
nance requiring connection to new sewer sys-
tem was not a deprivation of property with-
out due process since procedures available to 
residents insured notice and opportunity to 
be heard. Rupp v. GranUviile City (1980) 610 
P 2d 338. 
Standing. 
Plaintiff had sufficient standing to file 
claim where he alleged tha t property tax 
s tatute was unconstitutional in tha t it taxed 
a limited amount of property, and allowed 
expenditure of tax dollars on religious insti-
tutions tha t paid no taxes, thus resulting in 
his having to pay more in property taxes. 
Jenkins v. Swan (1983) 675 P 2d 1145. 
59-11-12. Payment under protest — Judgment for recov-
ery — Payment. 
In case it is determined in any action that a tax or license, or any portion 
paid under protest was unlawfully collected, a judgment for recovery and 
lawful interest, together with costs of action shall be entered in favor of the 
plaintiff. Upon being presented a duly authenticated copy of the judgment, 
the proper officer or officers of the state, county or municipality whose 
officers collected or received the tax or license shall audit and allow such 
judgment, and cause a warrant to be drawn for the amount recovered by 
the judgment in favor of the legal holder. When the judgment is obtained 
against a county, and any portion of the taxes included in the judgment are 
state, district school or other taxing-units taxes which have been or may be 
paid over to the state or to any school district or other taxing unit by the 
county, the proper officer or officers of the state, school district or other 
taxing unit shall, upon demand by the county, cause a warrant to be drawn 
upon the treasurer of the state, school district or other taxing unit in favor 
of the county, for the amount of the taxes received, together with legal 
interest and an equitable portion of the costs of the action. 
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TAX COURT ACT 59-24-2 
CHAPTER 24 
TAX COURT ACT 
Section 
59-24-1. 
59-24-2. 
59-24-3. 
59-24-4. 
59-24-5. 
Tax division created in each dis-
trict court — Jurisdiction — 
Probate division not affected. 
Appeal from tax commission to tax 
division of district court — 
Waiver — Review by Supreme 
Court. 
Appeal from tax commission to tax 
division of district court — 
Procedure. 
Burden of proof — Decision of 
court. 
Tax division of third judicial dis-
Section 
59-24-6. 
59-24-7. 
59-24-8. 
59-24-9. 
trict — Publication of deci-
sions. 
Tax division of third judicial dis-
trict — Judge permanently 
assigned — Qualifications of 
judges. 
Decision of tax division of district 
court as final determination. 
Appeal to Supreme Court from de-
cision or order of tax division 
of district court. 
District courts outside Salt Lake 
County — Service by third ju-
dicial district judge. 
59-24-1. Tax division created in each district court — 
Jurisdiction — Probate division not affected. 
(1) There is created a tax division in each of the district courts of the 
State of Utah which shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all appeals from 
and petitions for review of decisions by the state tax commission rendered 
after formal hearings before the commission. 
(2) The creation of a tax division in each of the district courts of this state 
shall not affect the jurisdiction of the probate division of those district 
courts to hear and determine matters relating to inheritance tax as con-
ferred by chapter 12 of title 59. 
History: C. 1953, 59-24-1, enacted by L. 
1977,ch.80,§ 20. 
59-24-2. Appeal from tax commission to tax division of 
district court — Waiver — Review by Supreme 
Court. 
(1) Within 30 days after notice of any decision by the state tax commis-
sion rendered after a formal hearing before it, any aggrieved party appear-
ing before the commission or county whose tax revenues are affected by the 
decision may appeal or petition for review to the tax division of the district 
court located in the county of residence or principal place of business of the 
affected taxpayer or, in the case of a taxpayer whose taxes are assessed on a 
statewide basis, to the tax division of the third judicial district court in and 
for Salt Lake County. 
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(2) In all cases, whether or not proper under subsection (1), any ag-
grieved party appearing before the state tax commission or county whose 
tax revenues are affected by the decision may appeal or petition for review 
a decision rendered after a formal hearing of the commission to the tax 
division of the third judicial district court in and for Salt Lake County 
within the specified 30 days following notice of such decision. 
(3) In the alternative, a taxpayer may waive review and trial de novo in 
the tax division of the district court and, within the specified 30 days fol-
lowing the required notice, may seek review by the Utah Supreme Court 
upon writ of certiorari. If a taxpayer or any affected county chooses to 
waive right of review by the tax division of the district court and applies for 
a writ in the Supreme Court, the taxpayer or affected county must (a) state 
in the application for the writ that the taxpayer or affected county is waiv-
ing the right of review and trial de novo in the tax division of the district 
court and (b) comply with the provisions of sections 59-5-78, 59-13-48, 
59-14A-77, 59-15-16 and/or 59-16-13 as though seeking review in the tax 
division of the district court. A county whose tax revenues are affected by 
the decision being reviewed shall be allowed to be a party in interest in the 
proceeding before the Supreme Court. 
History: C. 1953, 59-24-2, enacted by L. Failure to waive right to review in dis-
1977, ch. 80, § 21; L. 1983, ch. 278, § 2. trict court. 
Compiler 's Notes. — The 1983 amend- Failure to expressly waive the right to re-
ment inserted "or county whose tax revenues view in the tax division of the district court 
are affected by the decision" in subsecs. (1) and failure to state such waiver in the appli-
and (2); inserted "or any affected county" and cation for review by the Supreme Court upon 
"affected county" in the second sentence of writ of certiorari is to be treated as a plead-
subsec. (3); and added the last sentence in i n S deficiency of the kind to which the 
subsec. (3). pleader's adversary must make timely objec-
Sections 59-13-48, 59-14A-77, 59-15-16 and t i o n o r t h e r i S h t to o b J e c t t o t h e e r r o r i n 
59-16-13, referred to in subsec. (3), were re- P^ding is waived. Salt Lake County v. Tax 
pealed by Laws 1983, ch. 283, § 10. Comm. ex rel. Greater Salt Lake Recrea-
F J
 tional Facilities (1979) 596 P 2d 641. 
59-24-3. Appeal from tax commission to tax division of 
district court — Procedure . 
(1) All appeals from and petitions for review of decisions of the state tax 
commission brought before the tax division of any district court shall be 
original, independent proceedings and shall be tried without jury and de 
novo. 
(2) If a statute provides for an appeal or review by the tax division of a 
district court of an order or determination of the state tax commission or of 
any other administrative agency, the proceeding shall be an original pro-
ceeding in the nature of a suit in equity to set aside such order or determi-
nation. The time within which the statute provides that the proceedings 
shall be brought is a period of limitations and not jurisdictional. 
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History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 22. Salaries of public officers subject to garnish-
Cross-References.— Archives and Records ment, § 78-27-15. 
Service and Information Practices Act, exem- Tax levy for payment of punitive damages 
plnry damages under, § 63-2-88. awarded against elected official or employee, 
Health Care Malpractice Act, relation to this § 63-30-27. 
chapter, § 78-14-10. 
63-30-23, Payment of claim or judgment against state — 
Presentment for payment 
Any claim approved by the state as defined by Subsection 63-30-2(1) or any 
final judgment obtained against the state shall be presented to the state risk 
manager, or to the office, agency, institution or other instrumentality in-
volved for payment, if payment by said instrumentality is otherwise permit-
ted by law. If such payment is not authorized by law then said judgment or 
claim shall be presented to the board of examiners and the board shall proceed 
as provided in Section 63-6-10. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 23; 1983, ch. ment substituted "Subsection 63-30-2(1)" for 
129, § 9; 1987, ch. 75, § 8. "Subsection 63-30-2(5)." 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
63-30-24. Payment of claim or judgment against political 
subdivision — Procedure by governing body. 
Any claim approved by a political subdivision or any final judgment ob-
tained against a political subdivision shall be submitted to the governing body 
thereof to be paid forthwith from the general funds of said political subdivi-
sion unless said funds are appropriated to some other use or restricted by law 
or contract for other purposes. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 24. 
63-30-25. Payment of claim or judgment against political 
subdivision — Installment payments . 
If the subdivision is unable to pay the claim or award during the current 
fiscal year it may pay the claim or award in not more than ten ensuing annual 
installments of equal size or in such other installments as are agreeable to the 
claimant. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 25. 
63-30-26. Reserve funds for payment of claims or pur-
chase of insurance created by political subdivi-
sions. 
Any political subdivision may create and maintain a reserve fund or may 
jointly with one or more other political subdivisions make contributions to a 
joint reserve fund, for the purpose of making payment of claims against the 
co-operating subdivisions when they become payable pursuant to this chapter, 
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or for the purpose of purchasing liability insurance to protect the co-operating 
subdivisions from any or all risks created by this chapter. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 26; 1983, ch. 
129, § 10. 
63-30-27. Tax levy by political subdivisions for payment of 
claims, judgments, or insurance premiums. 
(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, all political sub-
divisions may levy an annual property tax sufficient to pay the following: 
(a) any claim; 
(b) any settlement; 
(c) any judgment, including any judgment against an elected official or 
employee of any political subdivision, including peace officers, based upon 
a claim for punitive damages but the authority of a political subdivision 
for the payment of an)r judgment for punitive damages is limited in any 
individual case to $10,000; 
(d) the costs to defend against any claim, settlement, or judgment; or 
(e) the establishment and maintenance of a reserve fund for the pay-
ment of claims, settlements, or judgments as may be reasonably antici-
pated. 
(2) It is legislative intent that the payments authorized for punitive dam-
age judgments or to pay the premium for such insurance as authorized is 
money spent for a public purpose within the meaning of this section and 
Article XIII, Sec. 5, Utah Constitution, even though as a result of the levy the 
maximum levy as otherwise restricted by law is exceeded. No levy under this 
section may exceed .0001 per dollar of taxable value of taxable property. The 
revenues derived from this levy may not be used for any other purpose than 
those stipulated in this section. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 27; 1973, ch. 1985, ch. 165, § 81„ to the extent that a de-
165, § 1; 1978, ch. 27, § 8; 1985, ch. 165, § 81; tailed comparison is impracticable. 
1988, ch. 3, § 234. Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1988, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend- ch. 3, § 269 provides that the act has retrospec-
ment substituted ".0001" for "one-half mill" tive operation to January 1, 1988. 
near the end of the section. Cross-References. — No judgment for pu-
The 1988 amendment, effective February 9, nitive damages to be rendered against govern-
1988, rewrote the section, as amended by Laws mental entity, § 63-30-22. 
63-30-28. Liability insurance — Purchase of insurance or 
self-insurance by governmental entity authorized 
— Establishment of trust accounts for self-insur-
ance. 
Any governmental entity within the state may purchase commercial insur-
ance, self-insure, or self-insure and purchase excess commercial insurance in 
excess of the statutory limits of this chapter against any risk created or recog-
nized by this chapter or any action for which a governmental entity or its 
employee may be held liable. 
In addition to any other reasonable means of self-insurance, a governmental 
entity may self-insure with respect to specified classes of claims by establish-
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